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The Division of Emerging and Other Com-
municable Disease Surveillance and Control,
World Health Organization (WHO), is revising
the often criticized International Health Regu-
lations (referred to as regulations hereon), the
central legal framework for addressing the inter-
national spread and control of infectious disease
(1,2). This process is under way as emerging and
reemerging infectious diseases are the objects of
broadening efforts and analysis by the national
(3) and international public health communities
(4). At least 30 new diseases have emerged in
the last 20 years, and still others, including
tuberculosis, malaria, cholera, dysentery, and
pneumonia, have developed varying degrees of
resistance to antimicrobial drugs (4).
The Intersectoral Nature of the Factors
Involved in Disease Emergence
Infectious diseases are emerging in the
increasingly global context of commercial and
demographic activities. The journey of microbial
agents from one country to another, often shorter
than the incubation period of the disease, is ren-
dering border controls futile. The response to
emerging diseases is increasingly global as well:
national agencies, international organizations,
and other groups coordinate efforts to monitor,
prevent, and control the spread of these diseases
(5). While no substitute for adequate national
health services and infrastructure, international
efforts against emerging diseases have increased
in importance as national programs have been
compromised by  complacency, economic recession,
international debt, civil turmoil, or natural disas-
ters (3,5,6). At the same time, detecting new agents
often requires up-to-date diagnostic facilities una-
vailable in many parts of the world. International
agencies have improved access to such facilities to
help define the causes of disease outbreaks.
The Current Legal Framework:
International Health Regulations
The regulations, which play a central, albeit
limited, role in addressing global disease out-
breaks (Table 1), have served as the primary
legally binding framework for preventing the inter-
national spread of infectious disease (Table 2). In
addition to its other legal and policy options for
promoting international public health, WHO’s
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World Health Assembly is specifically authorized
to adopt regulations concerning “sanitary and
quarantine requirements and other procedures
designed to prevent the international spread of
disease” (7, art. 21[a]). The twin objectives of the
regulations balance “maximum security against
the international spread of diseases with a mini-
mum interference with world traffic” (1, Foreword).
The regulations evolved from efforts to deal
with epidemics. The use of quarantine dates back
at least to the Middle Ages (3). Steps to regulate
countries’ actions to protect themselves against
the introduction of communicable diseases and
to report disease outbreaks developed before the
International Sanitary Regulations were adopted
in 1951 (8). Inadequacies of the current regulations
have been associated with outdated quarantine
and frontier-based practices.
The current regulations outline procedures for
limiting disease transmission in international
traffic, including the disinsectization, disinfection,
and deratting of ships and aircraft and the provi-
sion of sanitary conditions and health facilities at
sea and airports. In addition, the regulations focus
on two core obligations of member states relating
to disease incidence reporting and response; these
obligations apply primarily to the three diseases
subject to the regulations: cholera, plague, and yel-
low fever (1, art. 1). First, states must report to
WHO, within specific periods, cases of these three
diseases within their territories (1, arts. 3-7,9,11-
12). Second, to facilitate reporting and deter
unnecessary interference with international travel
and trade, members must limit their responsive
health measures (applied to international traffic
for the protection of their territories against
these diseases) to maximum measures permitted
by these regulations (1, art. 23). States must also
report to WHO any health measures they have
applied to international traffic (1, art. 8). Most of
such permitted health measures (and related
provisions in the regulations limiting or pro-
hibiting health measures) focus on cholera,
plague, and yellow fever; some more general
provision, however, limit measures directed at
other diseases (1, arts. 28, 29, 31, 81; 9).
   Like most international agreements, the regu-
lations are to be implemented through national
laws and policies that incorporate or otherwise
accommodate the regulations’ various provisions,
minimum requirements, and limitations. The
regulations have served as international reference
standards for some states creating their own
national quarantine provisions; this relationship
magnifies the effect of outdated and problematic
aspects of the regulations (and increases the
urgency of their timely revision).
Even though the regulations pose a legal
obligation for WHO members who have not offi-
cially “opted out” from participating, lack of
compliance has been an ongoing problem (8,9).
The regulations have weaknesses: 1) the limited
scope of reported information vis-a-vis the bur-
geoning scope of new infections, and 2) the mis-
match between the narrow institutional, political,
and legal bases of the regulations issued under
the circumscribed authority of a single specialized
United Nations (U.N.) agency, WHO, and the
varied factors affecting the international emer-
gence and control of infectious disease. The
factors include international trade and travel,
economic development and land use, changes in
human demographics and behavior, and the
breakdown of public health infrastructure (3).
WHO’s broad mandate within the U.N. system
(10, art. 57) and under the WHO Constitution (7,
preamble, arts. 1-2), to address these factors is
ultimately rooted in the one agency. While
WHO’s natural institutional allies tend to be
Table 1. Selected international health regulatory provisions
pertinent to emergent infectious disease
Provision Source/Lead Agency
International Health World Health Organization
Regulations




Codex Alimentarius FAO/WHO Codex Alimen-
tarius Commission
Annex 9:  Facilitation International Civil Aviation
to the Convention Organization
on International Civil
Aviation
Table 2. Development of the International Health
Regulations
Year(s) Action
1951 WHO Int’l Sanitary Regulations and
additional regulations in 1955, 1956,
1960, 1963, 1965)
1969 Revised and renamed Int’l Health
Regulations (regulations)
1973 Regulations revised
1981 Regulations revised (current version)
1995 WHO resolves to revise regulations3 Vol. 3, No. 1—January-March 1997 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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national health ministries, the factors affecting
disease emergence are multisectoral and can be
more directly addressed by a constituency of
international organizations and agencies. WHO
members’ violations of regulations during epi-
demics  (e.g., the implementation of unjustified
and illegal health-based trade barriers) are cri-
tical symptoms of the institutional mismatch.
Such barriers are rarely the product of sole
actions by the Ministry of Health, and WHO has
little influence over other national agencies such
as Ministries of Trade, Commerce, or Planning.
These core weaknesses are exacerbated by
the administration of regulations. In spite of the
regulations’ strong legal basis, WHO has fre-
quently preferred nonmandatory urging or media-
tion to a legally binding approach to members’
obligations (8,11). In the area of trade, for exam-
ple,  a Pan American Health Organization epi-
demiologic bulletin on the 1991 cholera outbreak
in Latin America referred to unjustified trade
restrictions imposed on Peruvian marine exports
as “not in accordance with the recommendations
of WHO” (12). More substantive is the ambig-
uous, indeterminate, or otherwise vague nature
of many of the regulations’ articles, which create
further difficulties in application (1, arts. 46[1]
and 36 [3]). WHO is unlikely to use formal man-
datory enforcement such as sanctions against
member states who do not comply with the regu-
lations (13). Under the WHO Constitution, typical
of such treaties (13), there are no formal punitive
sanctions. While under article 7 of the Constitu-
tion, the World Health Assembly is authorized in
“exceptional circumstances” to withdraw mem-
bership privileges, under treaties, such provisions
are rarely invoked and then usually on political
grounds against otherwise marginalized states
(13). These sanctions would also hinder the WHO
objectives of tracking, controlling, and preventing
incidence and transmission of disease.
The regulations contain a dispute resolution
provision that authorizes member states to refer
“any question or dispute” concerning the regu-
lations to the Director General or a WHO com-
mittee to “settle,” rather than to enforce (1, art.
93[1]). If this referral process fails, a member
state is authorized to bring the dispute to the
International Court of Justice in the Hague for
decision (1, art. 93[3]). The International Court of
Justice has, however, never determined a case
under the regulations and is a relatively rare
choice for disposition of international disputes
(13). WHO’s right to request advisory opinions
from the International Court of Justice has
yielded court rulings in only two cases. Thus,
disputes appear to be usually handled informally
through the WHO bureaucracy (8).
In this article, we propose two steps for improv-
ing the effectiveness of the regulations. Some of
the following issues are addressed in the Decem-
ber 1995 Report of WHO Informal Consultation of
Experts on Revision of the Regulations (14,15).
Step One: Expand the Information Base
The Limited Scope of Reporting
Under the Regulations
The current narrow scope of disease reporting
undercuts the relevance of the regulations and
has been criticized (16). In contrast to the long list
of known emerging and other infectious diseases
that threaten world communities and the threats
posed by as yet unknown or unrecognized diseases
or syndromes, only three diseases (cholera,
plague, and yellow fever) are expressly covered
by the regulations’ reporting requirements.
Additional obstacles to effectiveness and
compliance regarding both outbreak reporting
and minimizing of health restrictions arise from
limiting the range of information sources that
can report on these issues to WHO. WHO has
been criticized for relying solely on information
reported officially by member states regarding
outbreaks within their borders or health mea-
sures applied to traffic from the country involved
in an outbreak (9). To avoid self-incrimination,
members do not report on a timely basis, if at all,
as required (8,9,16). A related problem arises from
the right of the affected country’s health admini-
stration to determine the “infected area” of an
outbreak (1, art. 1), although that decision can
influence health measures other countries may
apply to persons, vehicles, and cargo from the out-
break area (1, arts. 46[1], 59, 64[2], and 66). WHO
appears to limit its sources for listing infected
areas in the Weekly Epidemiological Review
“only [to] official governmental information” (17).
Consequences of an Inadequate
Information Base
Driven by political and economic pressures
and other concerns (8,18), neighbors or trading
partners of countries affected by epidemics often
overreact by setting up border or other restric-
tions in excess of those permitted under the4 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 3, No. 1—January-March 1997
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regulations. From the beginning of the seventh
cholera pandemic into Latin America in 1991, for
example, trading partners of affected countries—
particularly Peru—at times rejected food imports
(19) or even nonfood manufactured goods (20),
restricted travel (19), or closed their borders.
Peru lost an estimated $770 million because of
the epidemic (4). In response to the 1994 plague
outbreak in India, some countries severed air and
shipping links with India; the country sustained
a reported $1.3 billion in export losses in 2
months (21). Concerns about potential trade and
travel restrictions have caused countries not to
report outbreaks within their borders (8,12,22).
Proposed Solutions to Information
Weaknesses in Regulations
The regulations’ disease coverage, reporting
of outbreaks, and disease incidence (and per-
mitted responsive health measures) should be
based upon an up-to-date schedule of the most
relevant clinical syndromes in conjunction with a
broadened list of relevant serious diseases.
Syndromes should be reportable until the under-
lying disease is identified. Descriptions of syn-
dromes and appropriate and inappropriate health
responses should be stated as clearly and speci-
fically as possible in the regulations. This approach
would align the coverage of the binding regu-
lations with the most appropriate and dangerous
diseases; it would also facilitate more direct and
coherent risk evaluation and present a framework
for addressing unknown or unrecognized diseases
and syndromes. It is also likely to expedite
reporting as there would be no need for disease
identification. It may also stimulate participation
by member states that have ceased complying with
what they regard as an outdated system (16). An
operations research effort by WHO and its mem-
ber states could facilitate the adoption of these
suggested improvements by testing the sensitivity
and specificity of syndromic outbreak reporting.
Similarly, to enhance the effectiveness of the
regulations, the acceptable sources of information
on disease outbreaks and health measures put in
place by member states under the regulations
should be broadened to include other reliable
sources. WHO’s use and acceptance of reliable out-
side information for such determinations will
provide more accurate information and may also
prompt more timely reporting by the affected coun-
tries faced with preemption by WHO and others.
The complex issues arising in international
relations are discussed elsewhere (14,23-26), but
the history of noncooperation with the regulations
does not preclude potential for improved com-
pliance in the future. If the regulations are
substantially and meaningfully revised (14,15)
and key countries are sufficiently concerned
about the dangers of emerging diseases to press
for compliance with the revised scheme, com-
pliance should improve (14).
Step Two: Expand Policy and
Programmatic Collaboration
International organizations other than WHO
deal more directly with the underlying issues
affecting the transmission of disease. The expan-
sion of international regulatory provisions in all
areas has increased the potential for overlapping
policies and even regulation.
Interorganizational and Interagency
Consultations
Revising the regulations presents an oppor-
tunity to establish interorganizational and inter-
agency consultations and address potential
contributions of agencies and organizations that
can most directly affect the factors involved in the
emergence and control of infectious disease. A
first step would be an interorganizational sum-
mit led by WHO to examine potential joint or
coordinated programs. The breadth and focus of
the summit will depend on the specific programs
most compatible with such an approach. WHO
has a long record of cooperation with other
agencies and organizations, and joint activities
are part of its programs addressing infectious
disease control (4). Contacts need not be limited
to the WHO-affiliated international organizations
but can include other groups: WHO will need to
evaluate whether participation by such agencies,
nongovernmental organizations, and other enti-
ties would be beneficial in a particular context,
and if so, at what points in the process.
Establishing new connections and building
on existing relationships between WHO and other
institutions and organizations (e.g., the World
Trade Organization, the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization, and the International Maritime
Organization) present many benefits: WHO can
bring its influence closer to the underlying pro-
cesses and organizational entities directly involved
in disease emergence and control; it can more5 Vol. 3, No. 1—January-March 1997 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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effectively use its limited resources; and it can
address initiatives in other organizations that
may be insufficiently sensitive to key public
health concerns. From an international relations
perspective, such contacts may ultimately develop
into direct links between the administration of
WHO regulations and that of other international
or multilateral organizations.
 World Trade Organization
Health-related trade restrictions are regu-
lated by multilateral organizations and agree-
ments (Table 1), such as the recently established
World Trade Organization (WTO) and its related
multilateral agreements, including the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS agreement). Like
the WHO regulations, parts of this complex trade
regulatory scheme address the health-based trade
constraints that countries may implement to
protect their citizens and territories from infec-
tious disease threats. Peru’s appeal to the GATT
Council for assistance in protecting its exports from
unjustified rejection during the 1991 cholera out-
break at the same time that PAHO was directly
involved in dealing with the epidemic exemplifies
this potential overlap of regulation (20).
The WTO agreements specify which health-
based trade barriers that would otherwise violate
a trade rule of WTO may be justified under the
exceptions in GATT article XX(b) for measures
“necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life
or health” and interalia under the related SPS
agreement that governs health measures pertinent
to most infectious disease threats. Therefore, a
WTO member’s “sanitary and phytosanitary
measures” (certain health-based trade restric-
tions) that meet the SPS agreement’s detailed
requirements are deemed in compliance with
GATT’s XX(b) exception. The SPS agreement
addresses all sanitary and phytosanitary measures
that a member may apply that potentially affect
international trade (27, arts. 1, 2.4) The WTO
agreements, in contrast to the WHO regulations,
are not disease-specific. The sanitary and phyto-
sanitary measures described in the SPS
agreement focus on risks to humans from diseases
carried by animals, plants, and their products;
the entry or spread of pests; and additives, con-
taminants, toxins, and disease-causing organisms
in food and beverages (27, Annex A, par. 1). The
SPS agreement contains measures focusing on,
for example, cholera as transmitted in inter-
national trade in food and beverages and
insectborne disease risks in international trade.
Measures directed against many health risks to
animals and plants are also covered (27, Annex A,
par. 1). Although the SPS agreement does not
refer specifically to epidemics, its stated scope is
broad enough to cover them, assuming the
agreement’s various requirements  are met (27,
arts. 5.7 and Annex B, pars. 2,6). However,
aspects of the relevant applications of the SPS
agreement are as yet not entirely clear. The WTO
agreement and related Dispute Settlement
Understanding have been in force only since
1995. Measures directed at trade-related infec-
tious disease risks not covered under the SPS
agreement may be addressed by the Separate
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, which
concerns product standards, or by the GATT
article XX[b] exception itself (28).
Like those of the regulations, the general pur-
poses of the SPS agreement include limiting
health-based restrictions to those that are neces-
sary and as minimally burdensome to trade as
possible. The SPS agreement provides detailed
rules and standards for determining what sani-
tary or phytosanitary measures are permitted on
the basis of scientific support, risk assessment,
and other factors (27, arts. 2.2, 3.3, 5 and Annex
A par. 4), as well as  numerous other provisions.
The SPS agreement provides, for  members’ use,
where applicable, certain established “interna-
tional standards, guidelines or recommendations”
(rather than their own standards) to promote inter-
national consistency on these measures. A member
must justify,  scientifically and otherwise, imple-
mentation of higher standards if they result in a
greater restriction on trade than the stipulated
international standard (27, art. 3 and Annex A,
pars. 2-3). For example, regarding food safety
issues, the SPS agreement designates the “stan-
dards, guidelines and recommendations”
established by the WHO-Food and Agriculture
Organization Codex Alimentarius Commission.
The Codex Alimentarius is an extensive code that
addresses a broad range of food production issues
including food additives, limits on pesticide resi-
dues, food labeling requirements, product com-
position, recommendations on food processing6 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 3, No. 1—January-March 1997
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techniques, and suggested inspection procedures
regarding food products and production (27, Annex
A, par. 3[a]). However, the regulations do not
mention the Codex (although it is a key part of
WHO guidelines on food issues).
WTO mechanisms for dispute resolution differ
substantially from those of the WHO regulations:
among other differences, ultimate adjudication
authority remains within WTO. Under GATT
articles XXII and XXIII and the Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settle-
ment of Disputes (Dispute Settlement Under-
standing), if the disputing parties’ consultation
and other preliminary steps do not resolve a
dispute, they ordinarily resort to adjudication
before a WTO three-person panel (29). The panel’s
report (including its recommendation if a viola-
tion has been found) is adopted by the WTO
members (sitting as the Dispute Settlement Body),
unless there is a consensus to reject it. There is
also a potential appellate procedure, before the
seven-person Appellate Body, regarding legal
issues. If the challenged trade restriction is found
to be unjustified (and the related rulings, usually
to bring the violating measure into compliance,
are not implemented nor is negotiated
compensation obtained), the injured member can
be authorized to obtain compensation by retalia-
tion: a proportional reduction in a trade conces-
sion or obligation owed to the violator. The
overall value of this mechanism is controversial.
However, since its establishment in 1995, some
50 requests to start consultations on disputes of
all kinds have been initiated; several cases are
before panels; two panels have completed pro-
ceedings; there has been one appellate ruling;
and ten disputes have been resolved by con-
sultation without resort to a panel (30).
Given the parallels between the WHO and
WTO regulatory systems and the interplay
between epidemics and trade, WHO consultations
with WTO would enhance coordination (or other
more or less formal arrangements) on trade
issues related to disease threats. Coordination
seems particularly appropriate in light of the
current revision of the regulations. As the range
of diseases and syndromes covered by the
regulations is substantially broadened, areas of
potential overlap or parallel may grow (15).
The SPS agreement provides for consultation
and coordination between the WTO system and
those of other international organizations (27,
art. 11.3). The Committee on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures established under the
SPS agreement has a mandate to consult with
other international organizations in the field of
sanitary or phytosanitary protection (including
the Codex Alimentarius Commission); to obtain
scientific and technical advice for administering
the agreement; to avoid unnecessary duplication
of efforts; and to identify other international
standards, guidelines, or recommendations rele-
vant to sanitary and phytosanitary measures
that have a major impact on trade. (27, art. 12).
Consultation is also recommended for dispute
resolution. The SPS agreement encourages dispute
resolution panels deciding cases that involve the
agreement on scientific or technical issues to seek
advice from experts, including the relevant
international organizations (27, art. 11.2).
The WTO also has a Committee on Trade and
Environment, which addresses the relationship
of regulation and policy  on trade and Environment
issues, including issues concerning the SPS
agreement (31-32). In an example of a potential
consultation between WHO and WTO, a bulletin
of the Committee on Trade and Environment
indicates that the Conference of the Parties of the
Biodiversity Convention (an environmental treaty)
had requested that its Secretariat “liaise with the
WTO Secretariat and invite it to provide input in
identifying the synergies and relationship
between the objectives” of the convention and one
of the WTO agreements (33).
Collaboration and consultation on health-
related trade issues will depend on accom-
modating the many differences between the two
organizations, as well as WHO’s constitutional
provisions concerning such relationships (7, arts.
70-71) and the more limited articles in the
current regulations on such contacts (1, arts.
46[3], 85). While establishing working relation-
ships with WTO   might not be a panacea for the
many trade-related concerns under the WHO
regulations, it would provide opportunities for
reinforcement of the legal and institutional bases
for the prevention of inappropriate trade restraints.
International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO)
Because of the importance of international
travel (as well as air transportation of cargo) to
disease emergence, ICAO is another important col-
laborative partner. Unlike WTO, however, ICAO
has had a long-standing relationship with WHO,
dating from the 1940s and including participation7 Vol. 3, No. 1—January-March 1997 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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in creating the regulations (8). The conflicting pres-
sures of globalization of world transport (and com-
merce) and sovereignty have affected the ability of
ICAO and WHO to regulate effectively (34).
In preventing infectious diseases, WHO and
ICAO have overlapping areas of interest, such as
the disinsectization of aircraft and airport health
and sanitary facilities. Under the Convention on
International Civil Aviation and related instru-
ments, ICAO addresses a variety of civil aviation
issues, including many relating to public health
and international transmission of disease. The
convention provides that each member state
“agrees to take effective measures to prevent the
spread by means of air navigation of cholera,
epidemic typhus, smallpox, yellow fever, plague,
and such other communicable diseases as the
contracting States shall ... designate” and to
“keep in close consultation with the agencies
(such as WHO) concerned with international regu-
lations relating to sanitary measures applicable
to aircraft” (35). The specific compulsory “Stan-
dards” and related “Recommended Practices” in
Annex 9 to the convention include those applicable
to public health, infectious disease transmission,
and related requirements (36). These provisions
are fundamentally tied to WHO recommendations
and the regulations in Standard 8.12, which
requires ICAO member states to “comply with
pertinent provisions of the current edition of the
[regulations].” Specific ICAO standards and
recommendations also refer to WHO recommen-
dations and regulations in key areas, including
aircraft disinsectization, provision of safe food
and water at airports and on aircraft at inter-
national airports, proper facilities for disposal of
refuse, waste, wastewater, and other dangerous
matter, and yellow fever certificates.
WHO cooperation with ICAO is exemplified
by the participation of ICAO in the 1995 informal
WHO consultation regarding revision of the regu-
lations; ICAO was the only such international
organization to participate in the consultation
(15). The consulting group’s recommendations
suggested that certain sections of the revised
regulations concerning sanitation standards at
airports and seaports should refer to the
applicable requirements (exceptions being health
care services for sick persons on arrival, equip-
ment necessary for disinfection, and disin-
sectization, and control of animal-borne disease),
under other international agreements, such as
Annex 9. Although this specific recommendation
may have flaws (for example, it effectively renders
the regulations incomplete in themselves as a ref-
erence or guide to essential rules), it demonstrates
ongoing attempts to link the two organizations.
Coordination of WHO and ICAO in dealing
with the inappropriate imposition of health mea-
sures is particularly relevant now.  At a 1995 ses-
sion of the ICAO division with jurisdiction over
such public health issues, “[d]elegates recom-
mended that ICAO work with the World Health
Organization ... to draft joint guidelines that, if
followed, would prevent adoption by Contracting
States of excessive health measures that might
disrupt international air transport services in
cases of outbreaks or epidemics of diseases” (37).
International Maritime Organization (IMO)
Provisions under the regulations concerning
deratting procedures (as noted in the WHO infor-
mal consultation on revision of the regulations)
(15) and sanitary conditions at seaports also play
an important role in maritime health and in
containing international disease transmission
threats. The regulations also address cholera-
contaminated bilge water in certain circumstances
on arrival of the ship (1, art. 62[1]). Health
authorities are broadly authorized to take
measures “to control the discharge from any ship
of sewage and refuse which might contaminate
the waters of a port, river or canal” (1, art. 29).
IMO has recognized the global public health
problems of bacterial and viral diseases
transmitted in discharges of ballast water and
sediment (38). A poll of IMO member states indi-
cated that such transmission is a major inter-
national problem expected to worsen (38). The
IMO assembly has accordingly adopted (generally
nonmandatory) guidelines to prevent the
introduction of bacterial and viral pathogens in
ballast water and sediment. The IMO resolution
traced this concern in part to the 1973 Inter-
national Conference on Marine Pollution, in
which the parties called for WHO, in collaboration
with IMO, “to carry out research into the role of
ballast water as a medium for the spreading of
epidemic disease bacteria” (38).
A sound legal and policy framework is needed
to support efforts against emergent infections.
Truly intersectoral, interagency, and inter-
organizational collaboration in addressing the
broad factors of emergence and expanded
reporting of disease are major steps in this
process. The challenge is broad, but in view of the8 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 3, No. 1—January-March 1997
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increased pace of emergence and the globalization
of disease, the importance of a comprehensive
legal and policy framework cannot be overstated.
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